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When Helpers Hurt: Protecting
Taxpayers From Preparers
By Michelle Lyon Drumbl
In 2011 return preparers assembled more than 78
million individual income tax returns.1 Of those 78
million, more than half — 42 million — were
prepared by unlicensed and unregulated return
preparers.2
How and whether the return preparer industry
can or should be regulated are fiercely debated
questions and have been the subject of recent liti-
gation.3 Following its 2009 return preparer review,
the IRS established a program in 2011 that required
return preparers to obtain a preparer tax identifica-
tion number, pass a suitability check, complete
competency testing, and take 15 credits of continu-
ing education courses annually.4 Through that pro-
gram, the IRS intended Circular 230 to apply to
those individuals under the theory that return
preparation is ‘‘practice before the IRS.’’5 Accord-
ingly, the revisions to Circular 230 created a new
category of practitioner: a ‘‘registered tax return
preparer.’’6 The return preparer regulations were
supposed to ‘‘improve the accuracy, completeness,
and timeliness of tax returns prepared by tax return
preparers.’’7 Regarding the application of Circular
230 to unlicensed preparers, the preamble stated:
This change will authorize the IRS to inquire
into possible misconduct and institute disci-
plinary proceedings relating to registered tax
return preparer misconduct under the provi-
sions of Circular 230. . . . The availability of
these sanctions will act as a deterrent to regis-
tered tax return preparers engaging in miscon-
duct because disreputable or incompetent
registered tax return preparers who are sus-
pended or disbarred from practice will no
longer be able to prepare tax returns, claims
for refund, and other documents submitted to
the IRS.8
In 2012 three unrelated return preparers brought
suit to challenge that version of Circular 230 in
Loving v. IRS. In January 2013 the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia issued a permanent
injunction barring the IRS from enforcing the regis-
tration scheme.9 After that setback, the IRS ap-
pealed, but in February the D.C. Circuit affirmed
the judgment, agreeing with the district court that
31 U.S.C. section 330(a)(1) ‘‘cannot be stretched so
1Section 7701(a)(36) defines return preparer as ‘‘any person
who prepares for compensation . . . any return of tax imposed
by this title.’’ See also reg. section 301.7701-15.
2IRS Compliance Data Warehouse, Individual Returns Trans-
action File and Return Preparers and Providers Database (tax
year 2011). See generally Nina E. Olson, ‘‘More Than a ‘Mere’
Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation,’’ Tax Notes, May 13,
2013, p. 767. By unlicensed and unregulated, I am referring to a
paid preparer who is not an attorney, a CPA, an enrolled agent,
or someone subject to state regulation. Those unlicensed pre-
parers work in a variety of settings, from large commercial
preparation chains such as H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt to
independent shops that prepare returns only seasonally.
3Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (2014 WL 519224
(C.A.D.C.)), aff’g 917 F. Supp.2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013). See also
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants v. IRS, No.
14-1190 (D.D.C. filed July 15, 2014).
4‘‘Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Rev-
enue Service,’’ 76 F.R. 32,286 (June 3, 2011).
5Id. at 32,288. The IRS maintains that Congress broadly
granted it the authority to regulate preparers under its delega-
tion to the secretary of the Treasury to ‘‘regulate the practice of
representatives of persons before the Department of the Trea-
sury.’’ 31 U.S.C. section 330(a)(1). See Brief for the Appellants, at
10, Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2013). See also
Publication 4832, Return Preparer Review (rev. Dec. 2009), at 33
(‘‘The IRS considers the preparation of a tax return for compen-
sation as a form of representation before the agency’’).
6See Circular 230, section 10.3(f).
776 F.R. 32,286, supra note 4, at 32,294.
8Id. at 32,295.
9Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp.2d 67, 80 (D.D.C. 2013).
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broadly as to encompass authority [for the IRS] to
regulate tax-return preparers.’’10
While the IRS did not appeal the D.C. Circuit’s
decision, it has not given up on its quest for
increased regulation of return preparers.11 In June it
unveiled a voluntary annual filing season program
that seeks to accomplish many of the same objec-
tives of return preparer regulation without mandat-
ing the registration program.12 Now the IRS has
been challenged again in the District Court for the
District of Columbia — this time by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. In its
complaint, the AICPA states that the annual filing
season program ‘‘is an illegitimate exercise of gov-
ernment power, as it violates the APA [Administra-
tive Procedure Act] and also represents an
impermissible end run around Loving v. IRS.’’13
Loving was decided on statutory construction
and administrative law doctrine,14 and the AICPA
follows a similar approach in its complaint. This
article, however, explores return preparer regula-
tion as a policy matter. With the government’s loss
in Loving, this is an appropriate time to reconsider
what would be gained by applying Circular 230 to
return preparers. Would doing so protect taxpayers
from their return preparers? Is the ability to sanc-
tion preparers under Circular 230 a meaningful
deterrent to misconduct, or are existing mecha-
nisms a sufficient deterrent? I address those ques-
tions in the context of low-income taxpayers, who
are among the most vulnerable people served by
unregulated return preparers.
A. Harms to Low-Income Taxpayers
Return preparers can harm taxpayers if returns
are not prepared correctly. Low-income taxpayers
with children are especially vulnerable because
their return may include a sizable refund claim
based on refundable credits. Congress has chosen
the tax code as the mechanism to deliver those
social welfare benefits to taxpayers, yet the refund-
able credit provisions are complex; as a result, many
low-income individuals rely on professional help in
filing their returns.15 If the return is audited and the
refund claim denied, the taxpayer is liable for the
deficiency plus interest and may be subject to an
accuracy-related penalty.16
Whether because of the differential in cost (real
or perceived) or marketing efforts directed at them
by unregulated preparers, taxpayers claiming the
earned income tax credit are more likely to use an
unregulated preparer than a CPA.17 Fringe prepar-
ers, or ‘‘businesses that are historically associated
with the exploitation of consumers, such as payday
loan stores, check cashers, and used car dealers,’’18
prey on low-income taxpayers. National Taxpayer
Advocate Nina Olson has described low-income
taxpayers as ‘‘often the least educated and least
financially sophisticated . . . thus, they become easy
targets for marketing schemes of unregulated and
unqualified so-called return preparers whose real
interest in the tax return process is to push high-
interest loans . . . and charge high fees.’’19
10Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (2014 WL
519224 (C.A.D.C.), at *1). Note, however, that the preparer tax
identification number regime was not challenged in Loving, and
therefore, that requirement remains valid. See also Brannen v.
United States, 682 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012) (upholding the PTIN
regime).
11Following the D.C. Circuit opinion, the IRS released the
following statement: ‘‘As we assess the scope and impact of the
court’s decision and determine our way forward, our focus on
improved competency will continue.’’ See ‘‘IRS Statement on
Court Ruling Related to Return Preparers’’ (Jan. 22, 2014). See
Andrew Velarde and Jaime Arora, ‘‘ U.S. Won’t Take Loving
Decision to Supreme Court,’’ Tax Notes, May 19, 2014, p. 771
(Kathryn Keneally, Justice Department Tax Division assistant
attorney general, announced at the May 2014 American Bar
Association Section of Taxation meeting that the government
would not seek certiorari in Loving). See also Larry Gibbs,
‘‘Recent Developments in the IRS Regulation of Return Prepar-
ers,’’ Procedurally Taxing, May 21, 2014, available at http://
www.procedurallytaxing.com/recent-developments-in-the-irs-
regulation-of-return-preparers/.
12Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-29 IRB 192. As noted in the
revenue procedure, the Obama administration’s fiscal 2015
revenue proposals ask Congress to give Treasury and the IRS
legislative authority to regulate return preparers.
13Complaint at 2, American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants v. IRS, No. 14-1190 (D.D.C. filed July 15, 2014).
14For a comprehensive analysis of the administrative law
issues, see Steve R. Johnson, ‘‘Loving and Legitimacy: IRS
Regulation of Tax Return Preparation,’’ 59 Vill. L. Rev. 515 (2014).
15In tax year 2011, 59 percent of taxpayers claiming the
earned income tax credit and 65 percent of taxpayers claiming
the additional child tax credit used paid preparers. National
Taxpayer Advocate, ‘‘2013 Annual Report to Congress,’’ at 66
(Jan. 9, 2014). The numbers are not further broken down to
reflect the type of paid preparer or whether the preparer was
unregulated.
16For more on this issue, see Drumbl, ‘‘Those Who Know,
Those Who Don’t, and Those Who Know Better: Balancing
Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns,’’ 11
Pitt. Tax Rev. 113 (2013).
17‘‘Among those who reported using a particular type of
paid preparer . . . EITC claimants are more likely to use an
unenrolled return preparer (43 percent) or a preparer from a
national tax return preparation firm (35 percent) than non-
claimants (28 percent and 14 percent, respectively). In contrast,
non-claimants for EITC are much more likely to use a CPA to
prepare their return: 44 percent do so. This compares with just
10 percent for EITC claimants.’’ Publication 5162, Compliance
Estimates for the Earned Income Tax Credit Claimed on 2006-2008
Returns, at 24 (rev. Aug. 2014).
18Chi Chi Wu, ‘‘Riddled Returns: How Errors and Fraud by
Paid Tax Preparers Put Consumers at Risk and What States Can
Do,’’ National Consumer Law Center, at 4 (Nov. 2013).
19See Olson, supra note 2, at 770.
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To assess whether the application of Circular 230
to unregulated return preparers is necessary to
protect taxpayers, one must consider what risks
return preparers pose to the community that relies
on their services. Those risks are incompetence and
unscrupulous behavior.20
Much has been made of studies known as ‘‘mys-
tery shopper scenarios,’’ conducted by the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration, the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office, and consumer advo-
cacy groups such as the National Consumer Law
Center. Those studies, while admittedly small in
scale and scope, have revealed disturbing rates and
examples of return preparer incompetence and un-
scrupulous behavior.21
The mystery shopper studies reveal two common
fact patterns. The first is income omission; some-
times a return preparer does not include cash
income on the return even though the taxpayer
informs the preparer of it. The second fact pattern
involves return preparers who claim ineligible chil-
dren for the earned income tax credit, inflating the
refund by a significant amount. Other documented
examples of inflating a refund include return pre-
parers inflating or inventing itemized deductions.22
Those mystery shopper scenarios have been cited
in calls for and in defense of the IRS return preparer
regulation program.23 Indeed, many of the incidents
cited in the scenarios are disturbing, for example:
[The tester] reported that the tax preparer tried
to entice her to commit tax fraud by showing
her how much her federal refund would in-
crease if she took deductions in excess of the
standard deduction. [The tester] does not at-
tend church, but the tax preparer included a
$2,000 church donation. The preparer also
deducted the cost of work clothes and laundry,
then showed [the tester] that her federal re-
fund would increase to $3,000 from about
$1,000. The preparer also tried to convince [the
tester] to make up a dependent as she does not
have any — showing her that her refund
would go up to $5,000 if she did so. The
preparer also tried to qualify her for EITC even
though she is not eligible. Finally, the tax
preparer deducted $400 in 2008 tax prepara-
tion costs even after [the tester] told the pre-
parer that she did not pay for tax preparation
last year.24
The calls for regulation presume that testing and
certification can deter bad actors. Incompetence and
unscrupulous behavior are two distinct phenom-
ena, and I contend that it is naïve to expect that
requiring testing and certification would meaning-
fully reduce either.
1. Incompetence. Incompetence is an important
concern, especially in light of the code’s complexity.
However, it is not a new problem, nor is it a
problem limited to unregulated preparers. Attor-
neys and CPAs can be incompetent despite state
regulation of both professions, requiring the pass-
ing of minimum competency exams and comple-
tion of annual continuing education requirements.
The IRS return preparer regulations sought to
address competency through exam and continuing
professional education requirements.25 I am skepti-
cal that those requirements would reduce incompe-
tence. First, the new Circular 230 would not have
required attorneys, CPAs, or enrolled agents to take
the competency exam.26 Because most attorneys
have no training in return preparation, that doesn’t
make sense. Although attorneys have passed a state
bar exam and will likely complete several hours of
continuing legal education per year, those require-
ments usually focus on nontax subjects and would
not cover basic tax law. It’s true that attorneys have
a duty to provide competent representation,27 and
therefore, a diligent attorney would be less inclined
to prepare a return if it were not within his scope of
knowledge. However, that presumes that the attor-
ney appreciates the complexity of preparing a re-
turn. In fact, tax software may provide a false sense
of confidence, resulting in the professionals who
use it not recognizing the underlying complexities
of the applicable provisions.
Further, a bad actor who intends to commit fraud
is not necessarily incompetent. To the contrary, that
person may understand the rules well, allowing
him to know how to inflate a refund or omit income
while minimizing the chances that the IRS would
discover the scheme.
Finally, evidence suggests that the training the
IRS contemplates does not ensure competency.
Since 2004 TIGTA has performed an annual review
of error rates in returns prepared through the IRS
20See, e.g., 76 F.R. 32,286, supra note 4, at 32,295; Olson, supra
note 2, at 767; and Brief of Former Commissioners of Internal
Revenue, Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, at
14, Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061 (C.A.D.C. Apr. 5, 2013).
21For a detailed compilation of ‘‘abuses uncovered by mys-
tery shopper testing,’’ see Wu, supra note 18, at 5-13.
22Id. at 7-8.
23Brief for National Consumer Law Center and National
Community Tax Coalition, Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061 (C.A.D.C.
Apr. 5, 2013).
24Wu, supra note 18, at 7-8.
25Publication 4832, supra note 5, at 34-36.
26Id. at 34.
27ABA Model Rule 1.1.
COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINT





ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
volunteer program, which includes the volunteer
income tax assistance (VITA) and the tax counseling
for the elderly (TCE) programs.28 VITA and TCE
program volunteers are required to complete exten-
sive training on tax issues common to individuals
on Form 1040. That training culminates in a com-
petency exam, and volunteers must obtain a mini-
mum score to be certified as volunteer return
preparers. Volunteers are not paid to prepare re-
turns and thus fall outside the code’s definition of
tax return preparer.29 They have nothing to gain
from inflating taxpayer refunds, because no fee is
charged and VITA and TCE sites do not sell prod-
ucts that are tied to tax refunds. Yet year after year,
TIGTA has found high error rates in returns pre-
pared by volunteers. In its most recent report,
TIGTA described an overall accuracy rate of 51
percent.30 TIGTA attributes the inaccuracy to ‘‘vol-
unteers not obtaining sufficient information from
the auditors to apply the tax law correctly and
volunteers not always following intake/interview
and quality review guidelines.’’31 Thus, the inaccu-
racy is not necessarily attributable to a lack of
training in substantive tax law, but to an improper
determination of the underlying facts, for example,
failing to ask enough or the right questions, not
understanding the taxpayer’s answers, or making
incorrect assumptions.
2. Unscrupulous behavior. Unscrupulous behavior
is a threat to the fisc and taxpayers alike because, in
many instances, the return preparer is the benefi-
ciary of the wrongdoing. That is an important
distinction from incompetence, in that an incompe-
tent preparer is erring in favor of either the taxpayer
or the government. There are many examples of
unscrupulous preparers committing fraud and
identity theft to profit from an inflated refund,32
including diverting the refund to their bank ac-
count.33
Unscrupulous preparers pose a threat to unso-
phisticated low-income taxpayers in particular be-
cause they may be eligible for refundable credits,
such as the earned income tax credit, that are
intended by Congress to serve as social welfare
benefits. When return preparers cheat taxpayers out
of those benefits, the taxpayers are denied money
that might have helped pay rent, feed and clothe
their children, or pay for car repairs, or served as an
emergency fund.34 Instead, the taxpayers face ad-
ministrative hurdles and delays in receiving the
refund to which they are entitled because the IRS
does not authorize the issuance of a replacement
refund to a taxpayer who has been the victim of
return preparer fraud through a misrouted direct
deposit.35
But is regulating return preparers the most ap-
propriate solution to address unscrupulous behav-
ior? There are plenty of preexisting statutory tools
to combat unscrupulous preparers, ranging from
civil injunctions to criminal enforcement. Moreover,
Circular 230 empowers the IRS to censure, suspend,
or disbar from practice before the IRS a practitioner
who is incompetent or disreputable; who violates
some standards of Circular 230; or who, with intent
to defraud, willfully and knowingly misleads or
threatens a client or prospective client.36 If practice
before the IRS included preparing returns, a return
preparer who violated those standards would be
barred from preparing future returns. But it’s un-
clear that that adds to the existing statutory regime
— section 7407 already provides a path for the
government to seek injunctive relief against unscru-
pulous return preparers.
Unscrupulous preparers are motivated by their
own financial gain. They have discovered how to
manipulate a complex system to their advantage. To
presume that they would be deterred by Circular
230 is to ignore that unscrupulous individuals are
not motivated by ethics, reputation, or the right to
provide a consumer service. If subjected to Circular
230, unscrupulous preparers will find a new way to
operate in the shadows of the industry,37 or they
28The most recent of those reports was released on Septem-
ber 16, 2013. TIGTA, ‘‘Inconsistent Adherence to Quality Re-
quirements Continues to Affect the Accuracy of Some Tax
Returns Prepared at Volunteer Sites,’’ 2013-40-110 (2013).
29Section 7701(a)(36); see also reg. section 301.7701-15(f).
30See supra note 28. Note that this represents a small sample,
as with other mystery shopper scenarios.
31See supra note 28, at 5.
32See, e.g., Wu, supra note 18, at 13-15.
33See generally National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘‘2012 Annual
Report to Congress,’’ at 68-79 (2012) (describing the four
primary fact patterns in return preparer fraud cases that are
seen by the Taxpayer Advocate Service).
34For an interesting study of how earned income tax credit
recipients use their refunds, see Sara Sternberg Greene, ‘‘The
Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit
Recipients and a Proposal for Repair,’’ 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 515
(2013).
35‘‘The IRS Harms Taxpayers by Refusing to Issue Refunds to
Some Victims of Return Preparer Fraud,’’ National Taxpayer
Advocate, ‘‘Fiscal Year 2014 Objectives,’’ at 1 (June 30, 2013). In
contrast, a replacement refund will be issued for identity theft
by a non-preparer or when a paper check refund is stolen. Id. at
3.
36Circular 230, section 10.50(a).
37Unscrupulous preparers are clearly not above lying on tax
returns, and existing provisions requiring them to sign a return
or use a PTIN are insufficient to prevent fraud. See, e.g.,
Complaint at 7, United States v. Pernell, No. 14-cv-1637 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 10, 2014) (documenting how Pernell signed false names on
the preparer line and used other individuals’ PTINs). See also
‘‘Black Market Tax Preparers Continue to Defy IRS,’’ Forbes.com
COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINT
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will find a new vulnerability to exploit, because it is
exploitation — not return preparation — that is
their true profession.
Would the application of Circular 230 to return
preparers add anything new or more useful to the
deterrence of unscrupulous return preparers? In a
similar vein, would it meaningfully cure incompe-
tence? Or would a new return preparer regulation
scheme under Circular 230 merely burden indepen-
dent and small-scale return preparers without cre-
ating new benefits for taxpayers?
B. Does Circular 230 Address Harms?
Circular 230 was promulgated to regulate prac-
tice before the IRS. Before the 2011 amendments
that added registered tax return preparers to its
scope, it applied to attorneys, CPAs, enrolled
agents, and enrolled retirement plan agents. While
return preparers outside those categories were not
subject to Circular 230 before the amendments, they
were and still are subject to statutory preparer
penalty code provisions.38
In its 2009 return preparer review report,39 the
IRS noted that all paid return preparers are subject
to those code provisions, which provide both civil
and criminal sanctions. Without describing how the
provisions might be inadequate or too incomplete
to protect taxpayers, the report noted that attorneys,
CPAs, and enrolled agents (collectively referred to
as ‘‘practitioners’’) are subject to Circular 230. The
report further said that Circular 230 provides that
‘‘practitioners who violate these standards of prac-
tice or who are shown to be incompetent or disrepu-
table may be censured, suspended or disbarred
from practice. The IRS Office of Professional Re-
sponsibility is charged with investigating allega-
tions of Practitioner misconduct and conducting
disciplinary proceedings, where warranted.’’40
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia commented on the potential redundancy of
those regimes in Loving: ‘‘Congress has already
enacted a relatively rigid penalty scheme to punish
misdeeds by tax-return preparers. Title 26, in fact,
has at least ten penalties specific to tax-return
preparers, each of which targets particular conduct
related to preparing and filing tax returns, and each
of which comes with a specific fine.’’41 The court
said it was concerned that Circular 230 would allow
the IRS ‘‘the discretion — with few restraints — to
impose an array of penalties for this sort of con-
duct.’’42 The court wrote that section 7407 permits
the IRS to enjoin return preparers from practice
while affording them the protection of judicial
review; it noted that if Circular 230 applied to
return preparers, that would allow the IRS to bar a
return preparer from practice before it without the
protections of section 7407.43
Some law enforcement agencies have been suc-
cessful in pursuing fraudulent preparer practices.
The agencies relied on the code’s return preparer
provisions to do so, rendering it irrelevant that
many of the fraudulent return preparers were out-
side the scope of Circular 230.
1. Law enforcement agencies are finding success
pursuing unscrupulous return preparers outside
the scope of Circular 230. The IRS Criminal Inves-
tigation division, the Justice Department Tax Divi-
sion, and U.S. attorney’s offices have worked
together to prosecute return preparer fraud. The IRS
CI division’s return preparer program investigates
‘‘the orchestrated preparation and filing of false
income tax returns, in either paper or electronic
form, by dishonest preparers who may claim: in-
flated personal or business expenses, false deduc-
tions, excessive exemptions, and/or unallowable
tax credits. The preparers’ clients may or may not
have knowledge of the falsity of the returns.’’44
As a result of those collaborative efforts, courts
have issued permanent injunctions against some
return preparation chains and individuals barring
them from preparing returns.45 Individuals have
been sentenced to prison.46 In many cases, the
fraudulent preparers are ordered to pay restitu-
tion.47
Those law enforcement efforts and successes are
well publicized. For example, the Justice Depart-
ment Tax Division issues frequent press releases
describing its efforts and successes in combating
(Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kellyphillipserb/2013/11/18/black-market-tax-preparers-conti
nue-to-defy-irs/.
38See sections 6694, 6695, 6700, 6701, 6713, 7206, 7207, 7216,
7407, and 7408. Those include the provision authorizing a
federal district court to enjoin a return preparer from preparing
returns.
39Publication 4832, supra note 5, at 17-18.
40Id. at 18.
41Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp.2d 67, 75 (D.D.C. 2013).
42Id. at 76.
43Id. at 77-78.
44IRS, ‘‘IRS-CI Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Business Report,’’ at 5
(2013).
45See, e.g., Wu, supra note 18, at 14 (describing the case of
Justice Department v. Instant Tax Service). At the time the injunc-
tion was issued, Instant Tax Service was the fourth largest
commercial tax preparation chain in operation. Id.
46See, e.g., Wu, supra note 18, at 14 (describing the case of
Illinois v. Mo’ Money Taxes).
47See, e.g., Justice Department release, ‘‘Staten Island, N.Y.,
Tax Preparer Sentenced to Prison for Preparing False Tax
Returns,’’ 14-236 (Mar. 6, 2014).
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fraudulent return preparers.48 At the start of the
2013 filing season, it issued a release noting that ‘‘in
the last year, the division has obtained permanent
injunctions against more than 60 preparers and
promoters doing business all over the United
States.’’49
Publicizing those cases and shutting down na-
tionwide return preparation chains have a deterrent
effect. Those actions put unscrupulous preparers on
notice that the government will devote resources to
protecting taxpayers. The Justice Department issues
press releases not just when it wins cases, but also
when it files a complaint. Criminal charges, jail
time, and restitution arguably send a louder mes-
sage than the threat of Circular 230 sanctions. The
government would be better served by devoting
more resources to those law enforcement efforts
than to a new and redundant regulatory scheme for
all return preparers.
Unscrupulous behavior is not limited to return
preparers. Attorneys and accountants are capable of
misbehavior. A highly publicized series of events
led to the downfall of a tax attorney named Roni
Lynn Deutch, known in television advertisements
as the ‘‘tax lady.’’ Facing multiple lawsuits and
allegations of fraud and document destruction,
Deutch shut down her business, resigned from the
California State Bar, and filed for bankruptcy. As an
attorney, Deutch was subject to Circular 230, just as
the IRS argues all return preparers should be. But
although her alleged actions likely violated mul-
tiple provisions of Circular 230, those violations
were not the cause of her downfall.
2. The downfall of the tax lady: Despite Circular
230’s application, state law carried the day. Deutch
owned and operated a law firm with a staff of
attorneys and a sales force that generated about $25
million per year in annual revenue.50 Purporting to
specialize in tax debt resolution, the firm advertised
on late-night television. Law enforcement agencies
contended that the firm made false or misleading
promises about the services it could provide, in-
cluding statements that the firm’s ‘‘success rate in
resolving clients’ back tax liability with the IRS is as
high as 99 percent.’’51
Deutch’s firm was the subject of many consumer
complaints.52 Law enforcement agencies pursued
those complaints, not under U.S. law or Circular
230, but under local laws in New York City and
state laws in California. The New York City Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs sued Deutch in 2005 for
violations of the New York City Consumer Protec-
tion Law, alleging that statements made in the
firm’s television commercials misled consumers.53
Deutch settled that suit for $300,000 in 2006, but
larger legal problems loomed. In 2010 the California
attorney general sued Deutch for $34 million, alleg-
ing violations of state law, including making untrue
or misleading representations with the intent to
induce members of the public to purchase services54
and engaging in unfair competition.55
Following a court order for Deutch to repay her
clients and preserve business records, the California
attorney general’s office asserted that Deutch shred-
ded documents and diverted personal and business
assets to herself and her creditors.56 In 2011 Deutch
shut down her firm and surrendered her law li-
cense.
Circular 230 applied to Deutch’s actions, yet the
authorities didn’t use it.57 As in the examples of
federal law enforcement efforts against return pre-
parers, Circular 230 was not the most effective way
to pursue the alleged wrongdoing in that case.
If Circular 230 is not the most effective way to
address return preparer wrongdoing, what role can
48Justice Department Tax Division releases are available at
http://www.justice.gov/tax/taxpress2014.htm. Recent press
releases include news of criminal sentencing and civil injunction
complaints filed.
49Justice Department release, ‘‘Justice Department High-
lights Ongoing Efforts to Protect the Public and Shut Down
Fraudulent Tax Return Preparers and Promoters Nationwide,’’
14-145 (Feb. 11, 2014).
50Complaint at 4, People v. Deutch, PTC, No. 34-2010-
00085933-CU-MC-GDS (Superior Court of the State of Cal.
County of Sacramento (Aug. 24, 2010)) (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24,
2010).
51Id. at 6, 9.
52Although her business has been shut down, a sampling of




53New York City Department of Consumer Affairs release,
‘‘Roni Lynn Deutch Agrees to Pay $300,000 to Settle New York
City’s Lawsuit for Deceptively Advertising Tax Services’’ (Dec.
20, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dca/html/
pr2006/pr_122006.shtml.
54Complaint at 22, People v. Deutch, PTC, No. 34-2010-
00085933-CU-MC-GDS (Superior Court of the State of Cal.
County of Sacramento (Aug. 24, 2010)) (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24,
2010).
55Id. at 25.
56‘‘‘Tax Lady’ Roni Deutch Closing Law Firm,’’ Sacramento
Bus. J. (May 12, 2011), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/
sacramento/news/2011/05/12/tax-lady-roni-deutch-closing-la
w-firm.html.
57For example, Circular 230, section 10.30(a)(1) provides: ‘‘A
practitioner may not, with respect to any Internal Revenue
Service matter, in any way use or participate in the use of any
form of public communication or private solicitation containing
a false, fraudulent, or coercive statement or claim; or a mislead-
ing or deceptive statement or claim.’’
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it play in protecting taxpayers? Wrongdoing that is
the result of incompetence cannot necessarily be
cured through increased testing and mandatory
continuing education, but there is value in applying
Circular 230’s ethical rules to return preparers. And
they can apply without requiring burdensome test-
ing and continuing education.
C. The Value of Circular 230
Circular 230 imposes several affirmative duties
on those who practice before the IRS, many of
which do not apply in preparing returns for low-
income individuals.58 Those provisions that apply
are mostly redundant given the standards found in
the code.
For example, the code’s return preparer provi-
sions require due diligence. Section 6694 penalizes
preparers for understatements attributable to un-
reasonable positions or willful or reckless conduct.
Section 6695(g) imposes specific due diligence re-
quirements when determining a taxpayer’s eligibil-
ity for the earned income tax credit. Those code
provisions provide an incentive to return preparers
to meet competency standards. They are fully con-
sistent with the accuracy-related diligence in Circu-
lar 230, section 10.22 and standards of practice in
Circular 230, section 10.34.
Regardless of any redundancy between the pre-
parer provisions and Circular 230, there is value in
applying Circular 230 to return preparers. Aggres-
sive law enforcement may be the only way to curb
unscrupulous return preparation, but applying Cir-
cular 230 to return preparers could instill a greater
professional pride or duty to the system59 (or at
least a duty to the client) in those return preparers
who are not unscrupulous.
As part of its return preparer review, the IRS
considered options short of the burdensome regu-
latory scheme that it ultimately proposed. One
alternative that it considered but did not adopt was:
To require all tax return preparers to comply
with the ethical standards in Circular 230, but
not to require any tax return preparer to pass
an examination and complete continuing edu-
cation courses. Under this alternative, the pro-
visions of the rule clarifying that tax return
preparers are subject to the ethical rules in
Circular 230 would remain intact, but all of the
other changes would not be adopted.60
That alternative was rejected in favor of greater
regulation since ‘‘the benefits resulting from this
alternative would likely be less than the benefits
resulting from these regulations because tax return
preparers would not need to meet a minimum
competency level and keep educated and up-to-
date on Federal tax issues.’’61
I hope that the IRS will revisit that alternative in
the wake of Loving. Return preparers who resent the
cost and time of complying with certification and
continuing education requirements would not be
burdened by an additional layer of ethical stan-
dards, especially given that the Circular 230 stan-
dards are consistent with the code provisions that
govern those return preparers. At the same time,
applying the ethical standards of Circular 230 to
that group may help emphasize the importance of
its role to the taxpayer. Low-income taxpayers
claiming earned income tax credits are twice as
likely to be audited as the average taxpayer.62 If the
return preparer fails to ask enough questions, it is
the taxpayer who is ultimately responsible for the
liability. Those taxpayers benefit to the extent that
return preparers view themselves as professionals
who, like attorneys and accountants, are charged
with protecting their clients’ interests.
58Examples include Circular 230, section 10.23 (prompt dis-
position of pending matters) and section 10.37 (requirements for
other written advice).
59While tax attorneys are said to have a duty to the system,
it is not settled whether return preparers have the same duty.
For a thoughtful discussion of whether filing a tax return is an
adversarial process, see Camilla Watson, ‘‘Legislating Morality:
The Duty to the Tax System Reconsidered,’’ 51 U. Kan. L. Rev.
1197 (2003).
6076 F.R. 32,286, supra note 4, at 32,297.
61Id.
62National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘‘2011 Annual Report to Con-
gress,’’ at 300 (2011).
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